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Abstract
Humans and gods alike have since the dawn of time created objects in their own image. From clay figures and wooden 
toys—some granted life in myths and movies but also dead representations of their creators—to modern-day robots that 
mimic their creators in more than appearance. These objects tell the story of how we perceive ourselves, and in this article, 
I examine how they also change us. Robotomorphy describes what occurs when we project the characteristics and capabili-
ties of robots onto ourselves, to make sense of the complicated and mysterious beings that we are. Machines are, after all, 
relatively comprehensible and help dispel the discomfort associated with complex human concepts such as consciousness, 
free will, the soul, etc. I then argue that using robots as the mirror image by which we understand ourselves entails an unfor-
tunate reductionism. When robots become the blueprint for humanity, they simultaneously become benchmarks and ideals 
to live up to, and suddenly the things we make are no longer representations of ourselves, but we of them. This gives rise 
to a recursive process in which the mirror mirrors itself and influences both the trajectory for machine development and 
human self-perception.
Keywords Metaphor · Computational metaphor · Mechanism · Self-image · Computational theory of mind · 
Anthropomorphism · Robots · Robotomorphy · Behaviorism
1 Introduction
Humans and gods alike have since the dawn of time created 
objects in their own image. In the beginning, there were clay 
figures and wooden toys—some granted life in myths and 
movies but also dead representations of their creators. While 
Hobbes [1] provides an illustrative example of the early use 
of machines and automata as a way to understand ourselves, 
this article highlights how modern machines are used as 
mirrors for humanity. Today’s sophisticated robots running 
artificial intelligence (AI) systems mimic both mental and 
physical aspects of their creators. This makes robots differ-
ent from computers and non-embodied machines. While the 
computer is like a small make-up mirror that only lets us see 
our heads, robots are full frame mirrors that allow us to see 
intimations of ourselves in full. Their sophistication not only 
impresses, but inspires a certain confusion regarding who 
makes who, and how, in our relations with our machines 
[2]. Robots tell a story of how we perceive ourselves and 
the human condition, and in this article, I argue that they 
also change us.
Robotomorphy [3] is a term used to describe what occurs 
when we project the characteristics and capabilities of robots 
onto ourselves, to make sense of the complicated and mys-
terious beings that we are. The term mainly refers to robots, 
but as robots are based on computers and intimately related 
to other machinery, it is important to not limit this exami-
nation to robots alone. Before advanced robots there were 
advanced computers, and these also influence how we talk 
about and conceptualize the mind, for example. These dis-
cussions related to computers and other machinery are thus 
encompassed in the term robotomorphy, as robots are the 
embodiment and most human-like manifestation of these 
phenomena, while others are introduced as well. While we 
humans are frustratingly complex, machines are relatively 
comprehensible and provide a way to dispel the discom-
fort associated with human concepts such as consciousness, 
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free will, the soul, etc.1 However, using robots as the mir-
ror image by which we understand ourselves entails an 
unfortunate reductionism that influences what is perceived 
as important, which theories are accepted, and, ultimately, 
power relations between individuals and groups.
Furthermore, it possibly introduces deep misconceptions 
about what we are, but more importantly, what we should be. 
When robots become the blueprint for humanity, they simul-
taneously become benchmarks and ideals to live up to, and 
suddenly the things we make are no longer representations 
of ourselves, but we of them. What we make and what we are 
co-evolve [4, 5], and this gives rise to a recursive process in 
which the mirror mirrors itself and influences both the tra-
jectory for machine development and human self-perception.
This article develops the concept of robotomorphy and 
highlights the various ways using robots as mirrors influ-
ences our very understanding of ourselves, and also our 
societies through the implications this has for, for example, 
scientific activity. I begin by examining the use of machines 
as a mirror and some of the dangers involved in using met-
aphors. I then detail how robots also become ideals and 
benchmarks once the metaphor is accepted. Lastly, I explore 
the recursive nature of robotomorphy.
2  Machines as mirrors
The fascination with machines and automata as models 
of humans is not at all new, as demonstrated by Hobbes’s 
famous quote:
For seeing life is but a motion of limbs, the beginning 
whereof is in some principal part within, why may we 
not say that all automata (engines that move them-
selves by springs and wheels as doth a watch) have 
an artificial life? For what is the heart, but a spring; 
and the nerves, but so many strings; and the joints, 
but so many wheels, giving motion to the whole body, 
such as was intended by the Artificer? Art goes yet 
further, imitating that rational and most excellent work 
of Nature, man [1].
The machine is here used as a mirror to understand our-
selves—the heart a spring, the joints wheels. By this Hobbes 
demonstrated two things at once: firstly, how machines can 
be used as mirrors; secondly, how such use of mirrors tends 
to be associated with a reduction of what is mirrored. In 
Hobbes’s case, it served as a tool for developing his mecha-
nistic view of humans [6]. In contrast to Descartes, who 
believed that certain psychological phenomena could not 
be explained by mechanism, Hobbes argued that even the 
mind was mechanistic, and he was the first true proponent of 
such a view [7]. Mechanism has ever since been a source of 
vivid scholarly debates, as it also become the foundation of 
behaviorist revolution in psychology [8], and more recently 
the new mechanists who seek to explain all human phenom-
ena through mechanisms. Mechanisms are descriptions of 
causally determined systems or sequences that help explain 
the phenomenon we are interested in [9]. Examples of such 
mechanisms are neurotransmitter release, long-term and spa-
tial memory, hearts, and so on [9], some of which we will 
explore in more detail below. One purpose of making robots 
is to have them perform tasks, but they also serve as tools 
and metaphors for trying to understand how humans func-
tion, as Hobbes did in the quote above. In her famous essay 
“A manifesto for cyborgs”, Donna Haraway [2] deals with 
more sophisticated mirror images than Hobbes’s automata, 
as she suggested that the cyborg could be a fictional map-
ping of our social and bodily reality, and that it could be a 
resource for our imaginations.
In addition to being a source for imagination, I am inter-
ested in the more direct use of machines as human mirrors. 
As with actual mirrors, one might project oneself onto one’s 
mirror image, and while humans tend not to see their clones 
as separate beings, a range of animals fail to recognize that 
the mirror shows themselves. However, when we who under-
stand how mirrors work see our mirror images, this directly 
and profoundly influences how we perceive ourselves. What 
we see is what we believe we look like, but just like hearing 
oneself on a recording tends to be awkward because our 
voices are different when not heard through ourselves, what 
we see of ourselves is not necessarily what we are, or how 
others see us.
While anthropomorphism emphasizes how people often 
see themselves in other things, robotomorphy is about how 
we see robots in ourselves. Both phenomena are of great 
interest, but while anthropomorphism continues to attract 
much academic attention, the other side of the mirroring 
relationship between humans and robots is often neglected. 
Like anthropocentrism, robotomorphy can be used both to 
analyze and understand the interaction between particular 
individuals and robots and, perhaps more importantly, the 
long-term shifts in human self-perception.
Perhaps, the most basic example of how we use our 
machines as mirrors is how the brain, and our memory, is 
likened to the functioning of a computer. In 1960 Miller 
et al. [10] coined the term working memory, describing 
something akin to the random access memory (RAM) of 
a computer. This is the short-term storage which is seen as 
distinct from the long-term storage (which in a computer 
1 I do not argue that AI systems based on deep learning and artificial 
neural networks are easy—or even practically possible—to predict, 
but rather that they are more comprehensible than human beings, and 
that despite their unpredictability, we know how they function and the 
processes that lead to the unpredictable results.
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is the hard drive, or increasingly often a flash drive). This 
approach to the mind is referred to as the computational 
theory of mind (CTM), which stems from the 1940s and the 
work of Warren McCulloch and Walter Pitts [11]. Accord-
ing to this view, our minds are like computers implemented 
through neural activity. While the theory has had its ups 
and downs, and remains controversial in many circles, it 
remains influential, as shown by how the computer metaphor 
finds its way into introductory textbooks on human learning 
[12]. Modern theories of working memory, and the three-
component model of human memory preempted by William 
James [13] and articulated as the dual-store model by Atkin-
son and Shiffrin [14], does not state that the human mind is 
exactly like a computer. However, the CTM assumes a cer-
tain likeness, and the computer is often used as a metaphor. 
Other examples are the sociobiological narratives where 
individuals are seen as “satisfaction- and utility-maximizing 
machines” implemented through a form of “genetic calcu-
lus” [2]. While metaphors help make communication effec-
tive by transposing a known concept to another, this process 
is also associated with certain challenges, as I will shortly 
return to.
The CTM is not the only way in which we transpose our 
creations upon ourselves. Take, for example, the suggestion 
that we by looking through “the lens of computer science” 
can “learn about the nature of the human mind, the meaning 
of rationality, and the oldest question of all: how to live” 
[15]. Christian and Griffiths [15] proceed to state, with some 
enthusiasm, that the computational metaphor “can utterly 
change the way we think about human rationality”. Their 
basic idea is that by taking inspiration from modern algo-
rithms, those used to excel and exceed us at games like 
chess, go and StarCraft, we might do better than by sim-
ply relying on the faulty and irrational instinctive human 
decision-making processes. Granted, they acknowledge that 
computers lack common sense and general intelligence. This 
is an insight that has recently been pointed out by, for exam-
ple, Marcus and Davis [16], and preceding them is a long 
lineage of experts trying to convince those that do not fully 
understand computers that despite their impressive tricks, 
there are many things computers cannot do [17, 18].
The admiration for computational excellence abounds, 
and as robots become increasingly capable, the desire to 
learn from them how to optimize ourselves emerges. While 
blatant, the statement by Christian and Griffiths [15] does 
serve as a striking example of how machines that supposedly 
function like ourselves inspire efforts to learn from them 
how to overcome the inefficiencies of the human mind. 
These efforts connect with long and strong traditions in 
Western philosophy—particularly the ones where ration-
ality is portrayed as the truest and most authentic source 
of human excellence and uniqueness. After all, if there is 
one thing robots still are not, it is encumbered with human 
emotions. This was one of the more prevalent and recur-
ring areas of philosophical examination with regard to the 
android Data in Star Trek, as he both struggled to interact 
successfully with human beings due to this lack of emotions, 
while he also somewhat paradoxically seemed to yearn for 
emotions, which might in itself suggest that he already had 
certain emotions. The real life “robot mirrors” reflect an 
image in which the rational computer is what we see, and in 
which the human realities of emotions and their connection 
to human decision-making is stowed away, neglected, and 
at times forgotten, just as human phenomena such as con-
sciousness, mind, imagination, and purpose were purport-
edly stowed away with the rise of behaviorism [8]. Perhaps 
this is why we are so inclined to depict fictional robots as 
encumbered with just these emotions and the problems they 
at times lead to, for example in the case of Data, but also 
in that of Marvin, the depressed robot in Hitchhikers Guide 
to the Galaxy. While the fictional representations of robots 
are of great interest, I mainly focus on actual robots in this 
article, as real robots potentially influence us and change 
our perceptions of ourselves in a less explicit manner than 
do robots in books, TV shows, and movies.
Human relationships, some argue, are shaped by a myriad 
of factors other than those easily observable in any specific 
situation, such as history, biology, and previous experiences 
of both joy and hardship [19]. Not just relationships, but the 
mere fact of being human, and experiencing, is arguably 
characterized by how we are not pure sense and calculation 
machines but “situated”, both bodily and socially [4, 20, 21]. 
While there may be a partially shared epistemological posi-
tion present in efforts to model human phenomena by way of 
computers and robots [22], robots have a particular advan-
tage in allowing us to model more than human cognition in 
isolation. This is important, as the importance of situated-
ness is increasingly acknowledged [23]. Brooks et al. [23] 
state that the two key reasons to research humanoid robots 
are to pursue the engineering goal of making a “general pur-
pose flexible and dexterous autonomous robot”, while the 
other relates to what I am more interested in here, namely 
the pursuit of the “scientific goal of understanding human 
cognition” [24]. The pursuit of the latter approach is referred 
to as the synthetic method [25], in which artifacts are devel-
oped as models of human phenomena to gain knowledge of 
them. I return to this use of robots below.
Antonio Damasio [26, 27] has written extensively on the 
role of emotions in human decision-making, and particularly 
how it is inseparable from the concept of human rationality. 
Pure rationality, completely dissected from reason, makes 
little sense, he argues. This insight is one that is partially 
obscured by transposing the machine metaphor—in which 
reason is separated from emotions—to humans. As I will 
return to later, this particular discrepancy between machines 
and humans is now attracting increasing attention, and this is 
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an example of how the process of robotomorphy unfolds in 
practice. While Damasio [28] himself was previously skepti-
cal of the idea that machines could be made with meaningful 
representations of emotions, he has more recently joined 
investigations into machines with certain feelings and bio-
logical mechanisms [29]. Implementing homeostasis and 
similar biological phenomena for robots is one thing, and 
others are actively pursuing machines with intimations of 
emotions more generally [30].
2.1  The dangers of metaphor
Metaphors help make the unknown intelligible by com-
parison with something that is known. This is why a cog-
nitive psychologist or a neurologist—deeply enmeshed in 
the complexities and nuances of the workings of the human 
mind—might find the metaphor of the computer attractive. 
The human mind is complex, and human cognition and our 
memories likewise. However, a lot of people now know 
some basic computer science, and will, for example, recog-
nize the distinction between short- and long-term memory—
RAM and the hard (or increasingly commonly flash) drive. 
The experts can thus use knowledge of computers to explain 
in an approximate manner how human memory functions. 
The metaphor has worked its magic, and previous knowl-
edge of some other fact is used to foster understanding of 
something else.
However, this process is not perfect, and a range of prob-
lems are associated with the use of metaphors. First of all, 
the non-experts will not really have learned how the human 
mind works, but they will believe that they sort of do, and 
they may believe that they have something akin to a com-
puter in their heads. While their minds may previously have 
been mysteries to them, they may now feel a little bit more 
like the machines that surround them every day, even if the 
actual workings of their minds can be argued to be just as 
unfathomable to them as they were before they found some 
comfort through a superficial understanding. The CTM is so 
influential that most children will at some point be exposed 
to a wildly simplified version of it in school, and since most 
do not go on to become experts in neuroscience or cognitive 
psychology, the simplified beliefs tend to stick.
A different problem associated with metaphors such as 
the CTM, however, is that such models and theories will also 
guide and restrict the experts themselves. Even to experts, 
the workings of the mind are partly mysterious, and the 
temptation to dispel such mystery by focusing on what can 
be known, and fathomed, is great. Our ideals of science and 
beliefs about knowledge radically shape and guide what 
counts as relevant, and, not least, how all facts and problems 
are formulated [2]. The computational metaphor, for exam-
ple, has arguably led to a systematic devaluation of cultural 
dynamics [4], and this necessitates increased attention to 
the interactions between culture, metaphor and technology. 
The metaphor is powerful, as shown by its ability to thrive 
despite many efforts to combat it [4, 31, 32].
The computational metaphor is intimately linked to a 
wide range of other theories and ideological developments, 
and behaviorism plays a key role. The very term roboto-
morphy [3] is inspired by the term ratomorphy, coined by 
Koestler [8]. Ratomorphy describes what occurs when sci-
entists seeking to understand human (or animal) nature by 
studying rats proceed to transpose their findings to humans. 
Humans are seen as rats of sorts, and assumed driven by and 
susceptible to the same motivations and inclinations as those 
found in rats. Maslow [33] similarly lamented the fact that 
humans had for a long time been misunderstood because 
scientists had studied other animals and used these find-
ings to draw conclusions about human nature. Humans, he 
argued, are not primarily motivated by physiological needs, 
and by assuming that they are we will paint a flawed picture 
of human nature by trying to learn about humans through, 
for example, rats.
Robotomorphy is similar to ratomorphy in that it might 
engender a situation in which we seek to explain all human 
phenomena through mechanisms we can build into our 
robots—or that are at least hypothetically implementable 
in robots [34]. Such an approach lays the groundwork for 
a revival of radical behaviorism, which is a phenomenon 
Koestler also connected with the term ratomorphy. If we 
accept the robot as an image of ourselves, we become little 
more than conditioned reflex-automata [8], and this is par-
tially accepted by new mechanists directly or indirectly con-
tinuing the lineage of Hobbes and other early mechanists [9].
Also in AI ethics we find behaviorism, as John Dana-
her [35], for example, champions ethical behaviorism. This 
entails a rejection of the idea that what occurs inside our 
heads—in the form of unobservable thoughts and moral 
considerations—matters from an ethical perspective. Only 
actions matter. This also relates to efforts to understand 
human relationships, and whether or not robots can be, for 
example, friends, lovers, or good colleagues [36–39]. To 
answer these questions, researchers face the question of 
whether or not human relationships—or the human condi-
tion in general—is anything more than the actions they are 
usually associated with. If a robot says it loves you, and acts 
as if it loves you, who are we, Levy [38] asks, to disagree? 
Some draw on Goffman [40] and the idea that human activ-
ity is basically about performances [41], and the key ques-
tion becomes: is a lover, or a friend, anything else than what 
a lover or a friend is expected or supposed to do? The dis-
course on robot relationships of various kinds demonstrates 
how robotomorphy can change our perceptions of ourselves, 
as researchers strive to understand and conceptualize things 
such as friendship and love in ways that are compatible with 
the capabilities of robots [34].
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As we have no simple means to access the cognitive 
phenomena inside people’s heads, this is used to justify the 
behaviorist approach [36]. Out of sight, out of mind. Or, 
more specifically, as the mind is out of sight, we will simply 
focus on behavior. Phenomenology, for example, offers a 
radically different approach, and one key message of this 
article is that robotomorphy drastically affects the balance 
of power between, for example, behaviorism and phenom-
enology—the approach that emphasizes the importance of 
human experience, despite this not being observable. My 
argument is that neither approach is completely wrong, and 
more importantly that neither approach is complete. Both 
behavior and experience might matter, and robotomorphy 
might entail a danger of us losing sight of important aspects 
of what it means to be human. This relates to the historical 
debates about behaviorism in psychology [8], and Burt’s 
[42] quote could also be said to partly apply to what occurs 
with robotomorphy:
The result, as a cynical onlooker might be tempted to 
say, is that psychology, having first bargained away 
its soul and then gone out of its mind, seems now, as it 
faces an untimely end, to have lost all consciousness.
3  Robots as ideals and benchmarks
The history of the computer is rich and nuanced, and an 
important part of this history revolves around the competi-
tion between the machine and humanity. The computer was 
quickly able to out-calculate humans, and the competition 
has been particularly fierce in the world of games, such as 
chess and go, where DeepBlue and DeepMind’s Alpha-soft-
ware have conquered their progenitors [43, 44]. The question 
has not only been whether or not the computer can defeat 
its creators, but also whether or not it can fool them into 
thinking it is one of them [45, 46]. Robotomorphy tells the 
tale of how robots partly shift the rules of the game. Rather 
than humans being tricked into believing that the robots 
are human, the tables are turned and humans are somehow 
tricked into believing that they are robots.
But this is not all. As we are tricked by the robotomor-
phized mirror images into thinking that we ourselves are 
robots, all of a sudden it is no longer the robot that must 
live up to human standards. It is we who must live up to the 
standards of the machines. Robots manifest new standards 
of strength, speed, and precision, most obviously perhaps in 
industrial settings [47]. However, robots are now increas-
ingly also being seen as possible ideals in relation to previ-
ously human-exclusive phenomena such as care and love 
[34, 48]. As soon as human concepts such as “care” and 
“love” are adjusted to accommodate robots, the human-spe-
cific and non-computable aspects of these concepts are lost, 
and what remain are the parts that robots can—naturally—
do very well. They can provide what might be referred to as 
“perfect love” [49], if love is first changed into something 
that does not exclude robots. They have unlimited patience, 
the desired amount of servility and devotion [50], and they 
can also be esthetically ideal, and forever young [34].
These are all important aspects of machine use, but I 
choose to focus on a different manner in which machines 
become ideals. Machines are more rational—in a certain 
sense an embodiment of the enlightenment logic and West-
ern science—and humans are in this respect deeply flawed. 
Irrational and helpless, we are urged to aspire to the rules 
and performance of computational science [15]. And this 
is not limited to a marginal community of evangelist com-
puter scientists. Behavioral science, as exemplified by 
Thaler and Sunstein’s [51, 52] libertarian paternalism and 
nudge theory, which has mesmerized much of economics 
and public policy, also tell the story of how irrational and 
flawed humans must be helped and guided by scientific 
and more objectively rational considerations. Like way-
ward and primitive robots, humans must be shepherded, 
controlled, nudged, and prodded onto better paths—the 
paths determined by those with unsullied rationality and 
computationally superior capabilities.
How we shape the social construct that is humanity’s self-
image—constantly and changingly—is not only important 
because of what it means for individuals. It is also impor-
tant because it entails the exercise and shift of power. For 
one, robots are instruments of normativity. They are used, 
for example in therapeutic settings involving children with 
autism, to demonstrate and teach what is normal and desir-
able, despite the fact that robots themselves are only able 
to mimic a relatively small subset of the various social 
actions one would expect from a human being. They are 
also relatively uniform, and represent ability, functionality, 
and error-free cognition and physicality. Humanity is in a 
sense a rather motley crew, whereas robots eliminate much 
of this disorder and introduce uniformity, both in outward 
appearance and in behavior.
Where the yardstick is perfect computation and rational-
ity, human quirks and idiosyncrasies are flaws to be purged. 
The exemplars of human ingenuity, such as Einstein, Picasso 
and all the others hailed in Apple Computer’s iconic “Think 
different” ad from 1997, were both deeply flawed and highly 
remarkable. The ad suggests that their peculiarities were 
part of the reason they were special. Today, computers are 
perceived by many as new kinds of “geniuses” that have 
solved the folding of proteins [53] and former pinnacles of 
human intelligence, such as the most challenging games 
[54]. These computers—or, more correctly, their develop-
ers—excel because the systems adhere to a pure rationality 
and a narrowly purposeful approach to their tasks. They are 
not designed to have any major quirks in the way humans do, 
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as such quirks would be seen as simple errors. The human 
champions of chess still compete for second place—the posi-
tion of the best human – and while they play their games 
everyone watching is most concerned about how Stockfish 
and AlphaZero2 evaluate their moves.
Furthermore, the computers have no sickness or dis-
orders, and rarely do we see machines that represent and 
normalize individuals with specific challenges such as syn-
dromes or disorders. A more pedestrian example is the color 
of machines, and their genders, and even here robots fail 
to encompass diversity and inclusion [55]. Normativity—
the making of normal, so to speak—is related to power and 
superiority, and our machines are increasingly often chal-
lenged on the basis of their association with problematic 
social hierarchies [56]. Race is one thing, but feminists have 
also provided incisive critiques of how machines relate to 
structures of domination [2]. We might, for example, argue 
that robots exemplify a masculine ideal of rationality, dis-
interestedness, and strength—“Man, the embodiment of 
Western logos” [2]. However, we must also note that the 
structures and social constructs that are changed through 
robotomorphy may have been just as oppressive as those we 
arrive at. Haraway [2] makes this argument as she contrasts 
older hierarchies of domination with what she refers to as the 
informatics of domination. While robotomorphized human-
ity may be problematic, so may the preceding, and equally 
arbitrary and historically determined, images of ourselves 
have been.
Finally, as robotomorphy entails a celebration of logos 
and western science, it also poses a challenge to alterna-
tive ontologies and perspectives: the indigenous perspective 
[57], for example, and all other world-views in which some 
mystery is retained and cherished. As noted, robotomorphy 
coupled with behaviorism leaves little room for romanticism. 
If all that matters is what can be implemented in a robot, 
observed and scientifically proved, the soul, Mother Earth, 
God, etc. are no longer accepted and become quite simply 
what Hobbes referred to as superstition:
Fear of power invisible, feigned by the mind, or imag-
ined from tales publicly allowed, religion; not allowed, 
superstition [1].
Robotomorphy, when emerging from attempts to under-
stand the situated nature of human cognition, the role of 
emotions, or even consciousness and human experience 
in a manner not conducive to reducing these phenomena 
into something easily handled by existing technology, is 
not necessarily as problematic as it would be when based 
on simple and highly reductive approaches. The different 
approaches to robots together shape the totality of the impact 
of robotomorphy, and it must be stressed that it is a dynamic 
concept with ever-changing implications, partly because of 
the recursive mirroring involved in robotomorphy.
4  Recursive mirroring
Robotomorphy is similar to anthropomorphism and ratomor-
phy when it comes to mirroring effects and the constitution 
of new benchmarks. However, it is radically different from 
both when it comes to robotomorphy’s recursive nature. 
Anthropomorphism entails projecting human characteristics 
to things, but this is not assumed to affect the things them-
selves, as it relates mainly to how we perceive and interact 
with them. Similarly, ratomorphy entails a change of how 
we see ourselves on the basis of knowledge about rats, but 
this is not assumed to influence rats in any meaningful way.
Robotomorphy could be said to be special because the 
robots we make are seen as mirrors of ourselves, and if taken 
seriously, this means that these mirrors themselves might 
be susceptible to the very same process. If they are like us, 
they will, like us, be influenced by their mirror images. If 
we make a robot like ourselves, and if we are influenced 
by how our reflections appear to us, this could arguably 
lead to a situation in which the robot also changes when it 
faces us. Both humans and robots, then, are susceptible to 
reproducing selves “from the reflections of the other” [2]. 
Gunkel [58] emphasizes the importance of the concepts of 
the face and the other, and argues that robots can indeed be 
meaningful others. While robots may indeed become more 
than mirror images, few would argue that today’s robots are 
in fact capable of the kind of cognitive activity that would 
make robotomorphy irrelevant because they are exactly like 
us. As argued in Sætra [59], I perceive robots as instruments 
of human activity, and little more than advanced tools cov-
ered by a “veil of complexity” but without the capabilities 
required to be considered truly autonomous in terms of hav-
ing their own goals, purposes, and bearing responsibility for 
their own actions.
Robots are here seen as instruments capable of acting on 
behalf of humans, as they act on the instructions provided 
through programming. While these instructions are now so 
complicated that human designers might not foresee what 
the robot will do, this is argued not to matter in terms of 
responsibility and autonomy [59]. Robots, then, are media 
of sorts.3 But media are not just neutral channels through 
which we communicate, and according to McLuhan [61], 
the media is in fact the message. I propose that robots are 
3 I wish to thank David Gunkel for pointing out to me the relevance 
of McLuhan and how the theory of robots I advance in Sætra [60] can 
be translated to the idea of machines as media, or messages.2 The most commonly used chess engines today.
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not autonomous beings that influence us, but that robots are 
the creations of humans that communicate something of fun-
damental importance: how we grapple with understanding 
ourselves. Since the earliest depictions of robots in R.U.R., 
the play in which the word was first used and in which where 
they depicted as artificial worker servants [58, 62], robots 
have been used in fiction to highlight and analyze the human 
condition. This might entail examinations of the nature and 
morality of work and servitude, or how Data in Star Trek is 
used to highlight and explore the importance of emotions in 
human relations, or the nature of relationships, as the robot 
Adam does in McEwan’s [63] Machines like me.
However, as previously mentioned, some of the work 
done in actual robotics is also aimed at trying to understand 
how human beings function by using the synthetic method. 
While robots are imperfect and partial representations of 
what we believe humans are, some of the work in computer 
science, AI, and robotics can in fact be seen as an effort to 
understand and reproduce how humans are assembled and 
function. Through this function of robots, we have argu-
ably made progress on understanding a range of phenom-
ena related to human physiology and psychology, and this 
points to the importance of understanding the constructive 
and beneficial role of trying to make robots that resemble 
ourselves. The synthetic method involves using robots to 
understand what human beings really are, and is, when suc-
cessful, highly important. Biomimetic robots are not only 
inspired by nature, but are built as direct representations of 
various structures and systems found in nature [64]. Since 
the 1980s, Winfield [64] argues, there has been a significant 
shift toward biologically inspired robotics, even if not all 
biological inspiration leads to biomimetic robots. Some are 
inspired by biology, but mainly to serve other purposes and 
perform certain functions, or even jobs, and the biological 
inspiration will not necessarily result in particularly deep 
imitation of real biological systems. Biomimetic robots are 
part of the discipline known as artificial life—a discipline 
in which both computer simulations and robots are used to 
examine living systems. However, as already noted, humans 
are situated knowers, and humanoid robots may thus have a 
particular edge when true-to-life models of humans are the 
goal [23]. It must also be noted that turning to the biological 
realm for inspiration does not necessarily remove us from 
the fundamental mechanism discussed elsewhere in this 
article, as mechanists from Hobbes and onwards consider 
human beings to be biological machines.
The novelty of the concept of robotomorphy is that it 
provides a warning against believing that the insight gained 
through the use of the synthetic methods in fact does repre-
sent the true nature of humanity. One problem highlighted 
by robotomorphy is that the synthetic method might in cer-
tain cases lead to the creation of self-fulfilling prophecies 
whenever no objective evidence can be found to ascertain 
whether or not the models created through robots are in fact 
real representations of aspects of humanity. As robotomor-
phy shows, when we make such models, we change how 
people perceive themselves, and thus how they will act in 
accordance with this new self-perception, and thus poten-
tially validate models and hypotheses that are no more true 
than other alternatives. Despite this potential pitfall, the syn-
thetic method has allowed us to make increasingly complex, 
and intuitively increasingly correct, models of humans.
We made simple machines, which in turn inspired and 
facilitated models of humanity’s computational nature. We 
arguably perfected logic, computation, and narrow reason, 
and thus find new ideals in our constructions. Yet something 
is still amiss. The machines lack a certain sophistication for 
us to accept them as perfect mirror images, as we still strug-
gle to use them to explain the role of feelings, of biology, of 
morality. This gives rise to new efforts to construct human-
oid robots that model broader aspect of human existence, 
including our embodied nature and the role of emotions [29, 
30]. And as we do so, we wrestle with concepts such as 
“feelings” and “morality” and do our very best to reduce 
them into something computable—something that can be 
implemented in our robots.
This, then, means that even if the robots are limited, 
recursion occurs as we see ourselves a certain way and 
make machines to represent this, and this in turn changes 
and shapes how we perceive ourselves, leading us to make 
new and slightly different robots. The notion that we become 
what we behold, that we shape our tools, which in turn shape 
us [5], nicely captures the recursive nature of robotomor-
phy. Anthropomorphism explains how we see ourselves in 
other things, ratomorphy how we see rats in ourselves, but 
robotomorphy explains how we through robots construct 
messages conveying images of ourselves, which in turn 
change our images of ourselves. It is a recursive process, 
and it is the basis of a symbiotic and dynamic relationship 
between humans and our creations. As noted by Haraway 
[2], machines do not dominate or threaten us, as we are, in 
fact, they.
5  Conclusion
Robotomorphy as a concept is useful for describing how 
the robots we create end up shaping our perceptions of 
ourselves. It is linked to anthropomorphism, but it details 
a clearly distinct phenomenon worthy of the attention of 
anyone concerned with how technology influences individu-
als and society.
This article has told the story of how robots function as 
mirrors, and the argument is that the effects of these mir-
rors are inevitable and important. However, I have not 
made the argument that robotomorphy is wrong, or that 
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the machine metaphor is entirely misguided, erroneous, or 
dangerous. Through the synthetic method, new knowledge 
about humans’ physical and cognitive capabilities is created, 
and these advances are potentially of great importance both 
in relation to physical and economic health, in addition to 
the economic and social benefits that can be reaped from 
more flexible and capable autonomous robots. However, 
I have argued that the behaviorism often associated with 
robotomorphy does not provide a complete image of human 
existence, and that there might be clear benefits associated 
with factoring in human experience in addition to human 
behavior.
While I consider robotomorphy to be inevitable, aware-
ness of the mechanisms here described will potentially 
reduce some of its impact. However, I want to close by 
emphasizing one key take-away message: even if the 
machine metaphor leads us to conceptualize ourselves as 
robots, this in and of itself does not need to be accompanied 
with the idea that humans should be treated as such, or that 
robots should be our ideals. Neoliberalism, scientific man-
agement, nudging, and various other attempts to rationalize 
and optimize human affairs on the grounds that rationality 
and robotlike performance and precision are ideals, might 
easily gain ground with robotomorphy. It is thus important 
to keep in mind that what we are is not a determinant of what 
we should be, and that our values and goals as societies are 
not, and should not necessarily be, determined by how sci-
ence, and in turn we, perceive and portray ourselves. Arti-
facts, and cyborgs, have politics [2, 65], and so do robots. 
This is not to say that they should determine politics, but that 
it is important that we recognize their political implications 
and foster popular debate about how we should deal with 
our machines—both robots and the non-embodied varieties.
Declarations 
Conflict of interest The author states that there is no conflict of inter-
est.
Open Access This article is licensed under a Creative Commons Attri-
bution 4.0 International License, which permits use, sharing, adapta-
tion, distribution and reproduction in any medium or format, as long 
as you give appropriate credit to the original author(s) and the source, 
provide a link to the Creative Commons licence, and indicate if changes 
were made. The images or other third party material in this article are 
included in the article's Creative Commons licence, unless indicated 
otherwise in a credit line to the material. If material is not included in 
the article's Creative Commons licence and your intended use is not 
permitted by statutory regulation or exceeds the permitted use, you will 
need to obtain permission directly from the copyright holder. To view a 
copy of this licence, visit http:// creat iveco mmons. org/ licen ses/ by/4. 0/.
References
 1. Hobbes, T.: Leviathan, p. 1651. Basil Blackwell, London (1946)
 2. Haraway, D.Steven Seidman(eds): A manifesto for cyborgs: sci-
ence, technology, and socialist feminism in the 1980s. In: The 
Postmodern Turn: New Perspectives on Social Theory, Cam-
bridge, Cambridge University Press. pp. 82–115 (1994)
 3. Sætra, H.S.: The ghost in the machine. Human Arenas 2(1), 60–78 
(2019)
 4. Hayles, N.K.: Unfinished work: From cyborg to cognisphere. 
Theory Cult. Soc. 23(7–8), 159–166 (2006)
 5. Culkin, J.M.: A schoolman's guide to Marshall McLuhan. Sat. 
Rev. Ed. (1967) 
 6. Sætra, H.S.: Man and his fellow machines: An exploration of the 
elusive boundary between man and other beings. In: Orban, F., 
Strand Larsen, E. (eds.) Discussing Borders, Escaping Traps: 
Transdisciplinary and Transspatial Approaches. Münster, Wax-
man (2019)
 7. Husbands, P., Holland, O., Wheeler, M.: Introduction: the mechan-
ical mind. In: Husbands, P., Holland, O., Wheeler, M. (eds.) The 
Mechanical Mind in History. MIT Press, Cambridge (2008) . (ch. 
1)
 8. Koestler, A.: The ghost in the machine. The Macmillan Company, 
New York (1967)
 9. Krickel, B.: The mechanical world (Studies in brain and mind). 
Springer Nature, Cham (2018)
 10. Miller, G. A., Galanter, E., Pribram, K. H.: Plans and the structure 
of behavior. Austin: Holt, Rinehart and Winston, inc.  (1960)
 11. Piccinini, G., Bahar, S.: Neural computation and the computa-
tional theory of cognition. Cogn. Sci. 37(3), 453–488 (2013)
 12. Ormrod, J.E.: Human Learning. Pearson Higher Ed (2016)
 13. James, W.: The principles of psychology. Holt, New York (1890)
 14. Atkinson, R.C., Shiffrin, Kenneth Spence Janet Taylor Spence 
(eds) R.M.:+ Human memory: a proposed system and its control 
processes. In: Psychology of Learning and Motivation, vol. 2, pp. 
89–195. Elsevier (1968)
 15. Christian, B., Griffiths, T.: Algorithms to Live By: The Computer 
Science of Human Decisions. William Collins, London (2016)
 16. Marcus, G., Davis, E.: Rebooting AI: Building Artificial Intel-
ligence We Can Trust. Pantheon (2019)
 17. Dreyfus, H.: What Computers Still Can’t Do: A Critique of Arti-
ficial Reason. MIT Press (1992)
 18. Dreyfus, H.: What computers can’t do: the limits of artificial intel-
ligence. New York: Harper & Row. 1972
 19. Turkle, S.: Alone Together: Why We Expect More From Technol-
ogy and Less From Each Other, p. Hachette UK. (2017)
 20. Haraway, D.: Situated knowledges: The science question in femi-
nism and the privilege of partial perspective. Fem. Stud. 14(3), 
575–599 (1988)
 21. Lindblom, J., Ziemke, T.: Social situatedness of natural and arti-
ficial intelligence: Vygotsky and beyond. Adapt. Behav. 11(2), 
79–96 (2003)
 22. Jones, R.A.: Projective anthropomorphism as a dialogue with our-
selves. Int. J. Soc. Robot., pp. 1–7 (2021). https:// doi. org/ 10. 1007/ 
s12369- 021- 00793-7
 23. Brooks, R.A., Breazeal, C., Marjanović, M., Scassellati, B., Wil-
liamson, M.M.: The Cog project: Building a humanoid robot. In: 
International Workshop on Computation for Metaphors, Analogy, 
and Agents, pp. 52-87. Springer (1998)
 24. Brooks, R.A., Stein, L.A.: Building brains for bodies. Auton. 
Robot. 1(1), 7–25 (1994)
 25. Cordeschi, R.: Steps toward the synthetic method: symbolic infor-
mation processing and self-organizing systems in early Artificial 
Intelligence. In: Husbands, P., Holland, O., Wheeler, M. (eds.) 
The Mechanical Mind in History. MIT Press, Cambridge (2008)
AI and Ethics 
1 3
 26. Damasio, A.: Descartes’ Error: Emotion, Reason, and the Human 
Brain. Quill, New York (2006)
 27. Damasio, A.: Looking for Spinoza: Joy, Sorrow, and the Feeling 
Brain. Harcourt Inc, Orlando (2003)
 28. Damasio, A.: The Strange Order of Things: Life, Feeling, and the 
Making of Cultures. Pantheon Books, New York (2018)
 29. Man, K., Damasio, A.: Homeostasis and soft robotics in the design 
of feeling machines. Nat. Mach. Intell. 1(10), 446–452 (2019)
 30. Cominelli, L., Mazzei, D., De Rossi, D.E.: SEAI: Social emotional 
artificial intelligence based on Damasio’s theory of mind. Front. 
Robot. AI 5, 6 (2018)
 31. Ibáñez, A., Cosmelli, D.: Moving Beyond Computational Cogni-
tivism: Understanding Intentionality, Intersubjectivity and Ecol-
ogy of Mind. Springer (2008)
 32. Pettman, D.: Love in the time of Tamagotchi. Theory Cult. Soc. 
26(2–3), 189–208 (2009)
 33. Maslow, A.H.: Motivation and Personality. Pearson Education 
(1987)
 34. Sætra, H.S.: Loving robots changing love: Towards a practical 
deficiency-love. J. Future Robot Life (2021). https:// doi. org/ 10. 
3233/ FRL- 200023
 35. Danaher, J.: Welcoming robots into the moral circle: a defence of 
ethical behaviourism. Sci. Eng. Ethics 26(4), 2023–2049 (2020)
 36. Danaher, J.: The philosophical case for robot friendship. J. Posthu-
man Stud. 3(1), 5–24 (2019)
 37. Marti, P.: Robot companions: towards a new concept of friend-
ship? Interact. Stud. 11(2), 220–226 (2010)
 38. Levy, D,: Love and SEx with Robots: The Evolution of Human-
Robot Relationships. New York, Harper Perennial (2007)
 39. Nyholm, S., Smids, J.: Can a robot be a good colleague? Sci. Eng. 
Ethics 26(4), 2169–2188 (2020)
 40. Goffman, E.: The Presentation of Self in Everyday Life. Har-
mondsworth London (1978)
 41. de Graaf, M.M.: An ethical evaluation of human–robot relation-
ships. Int. J. Soc. Robot. 8(4), 589–598 (2016)
 42. Burt, C.: The concept of consciousness. Br. J. Psychol. 53(3), 
229–242 (1962)
 43. Campbell, M., Hoane, A.J., Jr., Hsu, F.-H.: Deep blue. Artif. Intell. 
134(1–2), 57–83 (2002)
 44. Chouard, T.: The Go Files: AI Computer Wraps Up 4–1 Victory 
Against Human Champion. Nature News (2016)
 45. Turing AM.: Computing machinery and intelligence. In: Robert E, 
Gary R, Grace B (eds) Parsing the turing test, pp 23–65. Springer 
(2009)
 46. Searle, J.: Minds, brains, and programs. Behavioral and brain sci-
ences 3(3), 417–457 (1980)
 47. Danaher, J.: Automation and Utopia: Human Flourishing in a 
World without Work. Harvard University Press (2019)
 48. Sætra, H.S.: First, they came for the old and demented. Human 
Arenas (2020). https:// doi. org/ 10. 1007/ s42087- 020- 00125-7
 49. Sullins, J.P.: Robots, love, and sex: the ethics of building a love 
machine. IEEE Trans. Affect. Comput. 3(4), 398–409 (2012)
 50. Viik, T.: Falling in love with robots: a phenomenological study 
of experiencing technological alterities. Paladyn J. Behav. Robot. 
11(1), 52–65 (2020)
 51. Thaler, R.H., Sunstein, C.R.: Nudge: Improving Decisions About 
Health, Wealth, and Happiness. Yale University Press, NewYork (2008)
 52. Thaler, R.H., Sunstein, C.R.: Libertarian paternalism. Am Econ 
Rev 93(2), 175–179 (2003)
 53. Senior, A.W., et al.: Improved protein structure prediction using 
potentials from deep learning. Nature 577(7792), 706–710 (2020)
 54. Google. "AlphaZero: Shedding new light on the grand games of 
chess, shogi and Go." https:// deepm ind. com/ blog/ artic le/ alpha 
zero- shedd ing- new- light- grand- games- chess- shogi- and- go. 
Accessed 30 March 2020
 55. Cave, S., Dihal, K.: The whiteness of AI. Philosophy & Technol-
ogy 33(4), 685–703 (2020)
 56. Katz, Y.: Artificial Whiteness: Politics and Ideology in Artificial 
Intelligence. Columbia University Press (2020)
 57. Gellers, J.: Rights for Robots: Artificial Intelligence, Animal and 
Environmental Law. Routledge, Abingdon (2020)
 58. Gunkel, D.J.: Robot Rights. MIT Press, London (2018)
 59. Sætra, H.S.: Confounding complexity of machine action: a Hob-
besian account of machine responsibility. Int. J. Technoethics 
(2021). https:// doi. org/ 10. 4018/ IJT. 20210 101. oa1
 60. Sætra, H.S.: Social robot deception and the culture of trust. 
Paladyn J. Behav. Robot. (2021). https:// doi. org/ 10. 1515/ 
pjbr- 2021- 0021
 61. McLuhan, M.: Understanding media: The extensions of man. 
McGraw-Hill, New York (1965)
 62. Horáková, J., Kelemen, J.: The robot story: why robots were born 
and how they grew up. In: Husbands, P., Holland, O., Wheeler, M. 
(eds.) The Mechanical Mind in History. MIT Press, Cambridge 
(2008) . (ch. 1)
 63. McEwan, I.: Machines Like Me. Knopf Canada (2019)
 64. Winfield, A.: Robotics: A Very Short Introduction. OUP Oxford 
(2012)
 65. Winner, L.: Do Artifacts Have Politics?, pp. 121–136. Daedalus 
(1980)
Publisher's Note  Springer Nature remains neutral with regard to 
jurisdictional claims in published maps and institutional affiliations.
